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“Every metaphysics begins with an anguish of the body which then becomes 
universal so that those obsessed by frivolity prefigure authentically tormented 
minds.”
 （E. M. Cioran, A Short History of Decay, p. 158, italics added）
　The “anguish of the body” in nineteenth-century British fiction may begin 
with the trials and tribulations of physical deformity or social invisibility which 
mark the commencement of the Bildungsroman.  Absent a confirmed 
patrimony or adopted, the orphan-figure searches for a name compatible with 
his body or its self-image.  In children’s literature, the fallen figure understandably 
comes to be obsessed with corporeal changes in size─an “anguish of the body”
─that poses the same question for Lewis Carroll’s Alice, “Who am I ?”  Identity 
and social assimilation compete with the frivolity of growing up.
　This disappearance of the traditional subject or its representational 
embodiment became a fugue in fin de siècle culture.  Jaffers, the constable 
charged with the capture of an elusive experimentalist following the robbery of 
a vicarage is, like the author of this essay, a critic of the absolute invisibility of 
the Invisible Man.  The law sees a crime, necessitating an intending, embodied, 
enacting subject, to be brought to book: 
‘What I’m after ain’t no invisibility, its burglary.  There’s a house been broken 
into and money took.’ 
 （Wells, IM 40, italics added）
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　As Lionel Trilling’s initially unremarkable “young man from the provinces” 
travelled a path from social anonymity─a metaphoric invisibility─to success 
or at least public recognition, so Griffin begins his life as an underpaid, socially 
invisible laboratory demonstrator at a sophisticated metropolitan research 
institution: the life of the faceless orphan in a scientific discipline.1 He then 
journeys to the provinces with a secret formula for induced invisibility, only to 
“return” to the anonymity of the “Omnium”（s）, the transparency （though not 
invisibility） of some collective singularity that marks a new institution, the 
urban department store.  Replacing socio-economic determinism with scientific 
determinism, Griffin is paradoxically restored to a more traditionally consumed 
body among a patchwork of commodities on display in an Oxford Street 
emporium, dying into life as yet another variably specular object on offer for 
mass purchase or its competitor in inspiring belief, community panic.  His 
trajectory thus reverses the more typical journey of Master Podnerevo in Tono-
Bungay, from youthful apprenticeship to a chemist, to the blatantly commercial, 
metropolitan application of that knowledge, to the production of transparently 
empty tinctures lacking therapeutic value.  Commerce in pseudo-scientific 
ideas, consumed by the masses as both desire and panic, would not be 
inconsistent with Wells’ “scientific socialism.”
　This inverted pilgrimage （which precludes self-knowledge, there being no 
traditional “self” in models of transparency or social invisibility） is an 
experiment that ends with a mock visual re-vivification in the near X-ray image 
of Griffin’s body in Wells’ “Epilogue.”  Among the new “transparencies” of a fin 
de siècle culture were extrusive celluloid, enabling cinema as a viable medium; 
the cathode ray tube; and, of course, the Roentgen and Curies’ X-ray image. 
Were he totally invisible, neither reader nor the Law could hold a sustainable 
belief in Griffin’s ephemeral presence which depends upon the confusion of 
Being-in-Becoming with the residual traces of Becoming-in-Being.
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　He continually affects others, unlike Henry James’ “lucid reflector” who has 
no identity save for the actions of other characters reflected by or in his 
responses.2  James’ narrative “body,” is rather a mirror through which the 
actions of others are reflected, indicating a persistent objective opacity.  Griffin’s 
corporeal transparency has, by contrast, both immediate and durational social 
effects on his adopted communities that, in combination, constitute his Being-
in-the World, even if not embodying traditional models of subjectivity.  His 
“invisibility” is rather a co-dependent metaphor in which a community comes 
to believe, as if it were a religious faith.  The “transparent body” served a 
similar, strategic role in the cultural life of the fin de siècle, with variations on 
the shapes assumed by its various cultural gestures and mediating 
incarnations. 
　Perhaps the best expression of Griffin’s ambivalent ontological status occurs 
in the first chapter of The Invisible Man when the newly arrived visitor seeks 
the hasty delivery of temporarily abandoned personal effects to the “Coach and 
Horses Inn.”  When the intruder/guest is informed that he will have to wait for 
delivery of his possessions, Griffin “laughed abruptly, a bark of a laugh that he 
seemed to bite and kill in his mouth” （Wells, IM 9 ）: in shor t, a sound 
interrupted.  Speech is emitted as an interjection only to be foreshortened or 
muffled in a mouth that is the only visible part of a body otherwise covered 
with bandages, as if the anxiety of the wound silenced the word.  The speaking 
subject is thereby, initially, constituted as a black hole—a “mouth ef fect” 
combining suf fering and reason—more akin to Plato ’s cave or Alice ’s 
exaggerated neck in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland: “the centre of his 
face became a black cavity” （Wells, IM 36, ital. added）.  Becoming is established 
as a perceptual value.  
　This suf fering channel simultaneously ser ves as a potential object of 
sympathy and an obstruction to the becoming of dialogic continuity.  Such is a 
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far cry from genuine invisibility.  Were he truly invisible, Griffin’s body could 
not be designated as a non-totalized cavity, for any hole requires a demarcating 
boundary to signify its presence.  Some defining liminal trace would have to 
remain visually present, against which a limited cavity appears.  Grif fin’s 
emptiness is de-noted and therefore part of a notational system which, like 
most, is a blend of presence and absence.  At his eureka moment, “invisibility” 
becomes a concomitant dependency of “transparency”: 
 ‘One could make an animal—a tissue—transparent !  One could make it 
invisible !  All except the pigments.  I could be invisible.’
 （Wells, IM 92, italics added） 
　Invisibility  is thus here confused with the merely unreadable or 
indecipherable.  But character, body, object, or text could be unreadable or 
indecipherable for a number of reasons while remaining perfectly visible yet 
resistant to cognition or continuous visibility, as Griffin and his formulas do 
throughout the novel.  It is precisely this quality—the manipulation of vision 
and hence re-reading by others—which renders him an object of both 
community hatred and sympathy, just as his then mysterious resistance to 
understanding could be the consequence of a perceived incompletion.  Either 
the remainder （the pigments） or a surplus of variable notational systems could 
occlude visibility, producing intermittent comprehension.  Like his notebooks, 
Griffin could be unreadable or incomprehensible as a consequence of having 
no consistent notational system rather existing as an amalgam, some 
indecipherable mixture, as exemplified in the allegedly Invisible Man’s diary 
perused by Vicar Bunting and Cuss.  His notebooks—a kind of “owner’s 
manual”—is as disguised as his body: both lack any interpretive legend, which 
literally or figuratively might throw light on some subject: 
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　‘There are no diagrams ?’  asked Mr. Bunting.  ‘No illustrations throwing 
light—‘
　‘See for yourself,’ said Mr. Cuss.  ‘Some of it’s mathematical and some of it’s 
Russian or some other language （to judge by the letters）, and some of it’s 
Greek.  Now the Greek I thought you—‘
 （Wells, IM 52, italics added）
　A representational discontinuity or elusive presence is not invisibility at all, 
but rather a transparency: we look at it and through it and see no meaning as 
inscriptive （and thereby consistently cognitive） meaning, but only a notational 
mixture of languages and numerical formulas; boundaries and holes; singular, 
imaginative creators and an automated production process that creates the 
illusion of the loss of individual control.  There is a compulsion to both 
decipher the secret code and for Griffin and the young scientist, Ponderevo, in 
Tono-Bungay, to “contain all sorts of irrational and debatable elements that I 
shall be the clearer-headed for getting on paper” （Wells, TB 6 ）.  Irrationality is 
an unreadable and thereby “empty” container to be “gotten down,” contained 
or embodied, so as to become visible, a synecdoche for a reproducible 
legibility.  One could also “get it down” by internalizing one’s notes as a 
digested “a-similation,” the negation of simulation.  The antagonistic notations 
could then illuminate each other as a set of the illegible and the enacted, yet 
lacking a link between the two mysteries.  
　Griffin’s interjectional “bark,” yet silenced （the aural/oral equivalent of the 
cognitively or visually interrupted）, achieves something similar to the effects 
of domestic lighting upon space in the visual experiment of The Invisible Man. 
“The Jolly Cricketeers,” the pub located adjacent to the regional tram line, 
allows light into its inner sanctums only intermittently by a system of “blinds” 
（Wells, IM 72） over low windows, producing an environment characterized by 
a light/dark contrast which can be par tially manually controlled and 
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manipulated.  Landscapes are dominated by black and white contrasts rather 
than chromatic nuance, the village itself appearing as a 
network of windows, beaded gas-lamps and shops with black interstices of roof 
and yard that made up the town at night.
 （Wells, IM 76, italics added）
　Difference within sameness being crucial to the beaded constitution of any 
genuine network, exemplified in Derrida’s infamous notion of the grapheme, 
there is an interstitial alternation of presence/absence; black/white; and 
fullness/emptiness that is collectively responsible for the generation of 
meaning in The Invisible Man.  In a curious way the architecture of the novel 
resembles Griffin’s body, riddled through and through “by interstices” （Well, 
IM 119） which could never be present in genuine invisibility.
　But the meaning thereby somewhat mechanically generated （like that of 
Wells’ “time machine” ?） would privilege a structural paradigm of oppositions, 
not mediation. The novel appears as a code dependent upon oppositions 
（solitude vs. crowds）, some of which are either imaginary from the outset or 
are vulnerable to easy de-construction.  But this semiotics of reading also 
informs Griffin’s own theory of his subject （the reduction in the coefficients of 
resistance to light） as a “network of riddles, a network of solutions gleaming 
elusively through” （Wells, IM 89, italics added）.  If solutions “glimmer…
through,” invisibility is intermittent, negated, as revealed in a comparison of 
networks to riddles.  The nature of any riddle （considered as a narrative genre） 
is that the solution to a conundrum is to be found within the statement, often 
by solving a pun involving some homonym: two words sound the same but 
have different meanings.  The solution involves not any traditional application 
of knowledge external to the puzzle.  Instead, we analyze a network of internal 
similarities and differences: the answer is “there,” but we cannot “see” its 
The Transparent Lie of H. G. Wells’ The Invisible Man　　7
transparent obviousness as we look for a more solid, authentic solution.  An 
example might be, “What is black and white and red （read） all over ?”  The 
invisibly transparent answer is, of course, the daily newspaper. 
　Transparency is here being conflated with invisibility, the confusion of two 
forms of the negative to which perhaps Kant first called our attention: the 
negative of simple limitation and the negative of opposition.  But the set of 
transparency and invisibility would illustrate the same problematic.  If we 
consider negative notions like disorder or non-being from the starting point of 
being and order as the limits of some deterioration in whose interval all things 
would be included, it is obvious that transparency （a deterioration of opacity） 
would resemble invisibility as the deterioration of the body.  Surely, the 
deteriorations （decadences） differ in kind, not merely in degree.  Yet, Wells 
lumps them together in a mar velous sleight of hand, which takes no 
cognizance of either the duration or the presentational attitudes of transparent 
and invisible objects.  A medium is abstracted into immediacy, inseparable 
from what is mediated.
　We must, like Bergson, think of differences in kind independently of all 
forms of negation and opposition which invariably posit a general idea of order 
or Being which can only be imaginatively constituted in opposition to non-
being.3  Being is always, like one （but only one） formulation of subjectivity, 
opaque, non-transparent, and solid.  But if the body is clothed and moves, it is 
visible, already partially obscured, as would be any number of its internal 
bodily functions.  Would progressive exposure （photographic or of the criminal） 
be an approximate correlate of Bergson’s iconic duration, insofar as each 
exposure is both （internally） incrementally dif ferent from itself and also 
different from any imaginably oppositional, Other ?  Like Bergson’s duration, 
the concept of exposure would create a virtual multiplicity—the perpetual 
coming into Being that achieves at the visual level what Bergson’s virtual 
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multiplicity does at the temporal level.4  Transparency would mark an 
intersection of visual continuity and visual heterogeneity.
　Similarly, Wells creates a doubly fictional general idea of the One, an 
invisible man, with a detailed revelation of Griffin’s productive methodology, in 
which transparency （both a negation—of an opaque subject—and the absence 
of negation, insofar as it transmits all light） is seamlessly elided with invisibility 
with no duration and no exposure.  Transparency has duration, depending upon 
conditions which render an object more or less transparent, depending upon 
the perspective of the perceiver and the conditions governing both the 
mediating agent and the object viewed. Invisibility would have no more or less, 
no internal differentiation: an object is visible or not !  Transparency is, by 
contrast, the agent for an elusive （but present） gleam or body.
　If a transparent object like glass is smashed into a powder of minute 
particles, the co-efficient of the resistance to light is lowered even further, and 
if those par ticles are then dissolved in another transparent substance 
（transparency squared, as it were） the result would be the invisibility of the 
glass in the water: “a transparent thing becomes invisible if it is placed in any 
medium of almost the same refractive index” （Wells, IM 91）.  But a “thing” is a 
medium only when it becomes an agent of transmission, by being partially （but 
not completely） emptied of its “thingness,” thereby becoming both a channel 
and the variable obstruction to a channel, simultaneously.  Of course, this is 
not genuine invisibility, but the illusion of invisibility—an optical illusion—
which depends upon blind faith, the acceptance of the virtual, as do other belief 
systems.
　The putatively invisible man who lends the novel its deceptive title seems 
simultaneously transparently passive （as a kind of empty or interrupted voice） 
and aggressive, as a murderer and robber, a continuous alternation in 
personality （a set） which is, in some way, self-cancelling.  He exists rather as 
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an alternation of effects upon a community with no consciousness of that effect 
or if there is some consciousness, it seems responsive only to threats to its self-
maintenance, as quasi-automated as we might expect from a scientific creation. 
There could thus be no “bad faith” or immoral intent, since in some way Griffin 
lacks intentionality, possessing only needs: food, cigars, money, and some 
secret sharer.  The same would of course apply both to the lonely Dracula 
desirous only of a very bourgeois value, a pied-à-terre in London, or the 
monster in Frankenstein, similarly desirous of and resistant to companionship. 
　The “empty body,” no matter how much blood or money it collects, remains 
humanly incomplete, as does our fiction of an invisible man. And one 
representation of this perpetual incompleteness, the absence of a ground, is a 
transparency, awaiting fulfillment by reader or community.  This “figural 
transparency” is socially manifested as a radical detachment of social or 
corporeal continuity coupled with an almost compulsive need for socialization. 
One of the visions held by a witness to Griffin’s behavior in Iping is that of a 
“’fistful of money’ （no less） travelling without visible agency, along by the wall 
at the corner of St. Michael’s Lane” （Wells, IM 69）.  The absence of visible 
agency is the operative idea, be it of people, money, or the random commodities 
on display in the modern department store （how did they get there ?）: all 
share a random circulation. As with Dracula’s climbing down a wall backwards, 
transparently visible through a blue flame, or similarly excreting money while 
being chased by the law in London, the absence of identifiable control or 
agency—be it the force of gravity or the protection of other containers—seems 
to generate meaning in certain familiar fin de siècle narratives. The loss of 
control from one perspective is an allegory of the absence of self-possession, or 
that uniquely British value, even etymologically, of propriety, in a secretion of 
secrets that is a prelude to universal knowledge.  This involuntary, reflex 
behavior is nowhere better exemplified than when Griffin’s sleeve （covering 
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an absent arm） smashes a glass into shards without his conscious awareness 
（Wells, IM 88）, as if he were reproducing the act which brings him about: tiny 
glass fragments.
　This production of textual meaning from contingent or antithetical 
alignments and their interstices is perhaps best understood in the heavily 
accented speech of one of Iping’s residents early on who notices a nose that 
appears as rather pink:
　‘That’s true,’ said Fearenside.  ‘I knows that.  And I tell’e what I am thinking. 
That marn’s a piebald, Teddy.  Black here and white there—in patches.  And 
he’s ashamed of it He’s a kind of half-breed, and the color has come off patchy 
instead of mixing.  I’ve heard of such things before.  And it’s the common way 
with horses, as anyone can see.’
 （Wells, IM 20）
The apparently naïve commentary upon Griffin’s appearance is significant, for 
he is simultaneously viewed as an emptiness and a kind of interstitial “mixed-
breed” fullness or excess emblemized in a chromatically self-cancelling pied-
ness, a difference within sameness: unmixed patchwork.  Griffin’s favorite time 
is the pied-ness of “twilight” （Wells, IM 22）.  This existential “dappling” is 
somewhat akin to that of the harlequin-figure, familiar in the visual and 
performing arts of the European fin de siècle, often in fact paired （“pied”） as in 
the figures of the early Picasso’s “Saltimbanques” series.  The clown of variable 
colors and shapes was a frequent companion in popular entertainment to the 
bismuth-whitened, colorless jongleur as his “double,” a pied-ness within pied-
ness （paired-ness）, visible, for example, in Andre Dérain’s portraits. 
　Although frequently overlooked by readers of Wells’ novel, Griffin makes 
quite clear that he had an inherited head start in constituting the fiction of his 
own invisibility, for the allegedly “invisible man” was born as “almost an albino” 
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（Wells, IM 79, italics added） replete with the pink and white face and red eyes 
that characterize this abnormality in pigmentation. Yet “almost” is a synonym 
of “not quite”; his genetic handicap was not complete but left Griffin with a 
residual liminal residue that attracts attention.  Commencing his life on the 
borders of pigmentation, resistant to a consistent reading or sympathetic 
understanding, Grif fin is always-already an almost: neither Being nor the 
negation of Being, but intermittently the victim of a public stare.
　Hence, the white bandages which initially define （even as they hide） Griffin’s 
face in Iping are really a “cover” for an emptiness, much as Podnerevo’s 
graphic skills in labelling, create “labelled bottles of nonsense” （TB 199） that 
cover a commercially naked wound.  Like the historical pierrot-figure of the 
Commedia dell Arte, Griffin’s presentational reality would be more accurately 
described as white-on-white.5  He deploys science cosmetically to compensate 
for （at the same time that it adds to） a physical emptiness.  In one incarnation, 
he is genetically-determined, and in the other, scientifically obscures social 
exposure by an experimentally-induced （social） mask—a positive negation—
made more obvious when he seeks refuge in the shop of a dealer in theatrical 
costumes, another mask or bandage.  He thus “doubles down” on his physical 
deficiency with his research, necessitating a kind of “double-reading,” 
represented in his choice of the improbable Marvel as a carnivalesque （pied） 
partner and ultimate heir.  Although he arrives in Iping carrying a genetic 
handicap that renders him vulnerable to prejudice, Grif fin’s research has 
displaced the handicap in such a way as to appear as the victim of an explosion, 
eliciting community sympathy.  It is of course a marvelous cover story: the 
victim of nature tortures a community, by evolving from an inherited handicap, 
to a victim, to the perpetrator of a ruse that terrorizes a village.
　Nor is Griffin the only chromatically challenged character in a very dappled 
novel, The Invisible Man.  The beneficiary of his notebooks and research, the 
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tramp Marvel, presents a similarly “pied” or chromatically variable appearance 
as he roams about the countryside as the double of the Invisible Man:
　You must picture Thomas Marvel as a person of copious, flexible visage, a 
nose of cylindrical protrusion, a liquorish, ample, fluctuating mouth, and a 
beard of bristling eccentricity.  His figure inclined to embonpoint, his short 
limbs accentuated this inclination.  He wore a furry silk hat, and the frequent 
substitutions of twine and shoelaces for buttons, apparent at critical points of 
his costume, marked a man essentially bachelor.
 （Wells, IM 43, italics added）
With his mismatched shoes picked up along the rambles of an aimless life that 
prefigures Griffin’s own wanderlust late in the novel, Marvel is in every way as 
“assembled” as is the scientifically- produced, prosthetic body of his benefactor, 
Griffin.  Even Marvel’s socks appear as an open/closed network, like that of 
window blinds: “his feet, save for socks of irregular open-work, were bare” 
（Wells IM, 43, italics added）, but not invisible.  Griffin and Marvel are in every 
sense “sympathetic” figures, even doubles, as physically aligned as social 
invisibility （neglect） with transparency, a vulnerability to multiple readings in 
communities where ever yone else seems to have a profession, or class 
affiliation which as-signs them.  The wandering tramp and the peripatetic 
scholar share similarly “self-made” bodies: a bourgeois model of subjectivity 
has visually disappeared into a black hole in one case and a costumed puppet 
in the other.
　Charged names signifying the operation of a quasi-traneparent idiolect 
abound in Wells’ navel.  Griffin as an “Invisible Man” belongs to the same 
nominalist register as do proper names like “Fearenside;”  the perpetually 
verbally bewildered “Cuss;” the hyper-reticent “Rev.  Bunting” who wiles away 
his hours behind curtains and surplice; or even that other pied harlequin, the 
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sartorially mismatched, “Thomas Marvel.”  Wells mixes the names of mapped, 
physical locations （Iping） with fictional villages in West Sussex like 
“Bramblehurst,” surely derivative of a real place, Midhurst.  Genuine villages, 
fictional places, a kind of portmanteau hybrid, straddling fictional and real 
locations, are aligned on the same map, mixing individual with geographic 
nomination.  So many of the proper names in Wells’ novel seem to participate 
in a collective assemblage from which each character or location takes a name 
or is given a name, which presumes to be proper, while retaining traces of 
intervention or insertion into a network of nominal pre-suppositions which 
show through.  “Where have I seen this, elsewhere ?” might be a critical 
response, just as it is in the perambulations of those who pursue the invisible 
man through a number of rural and urban sanctuaries. 
　Similarly, at least partially detachable from the urban “blind” of the crowds of 
Oxford Street’s well-named Omnium Department Store and the anonymity 
（but not invisibility） of crowds, Grif fin’s body blends in. The alienated 
individual, pursued by representatives of the law, nonetheless discovers 
himself amidst a pile of the indeterminate “stuff” which constitutes the modern 
department store where differential objects are aligned so that bedding, food 
halls, and cosmetics co-exist on the same display plane as objects on sale. This 
random and artificial alignment of the dissimilar series creates the illusion of 
both some shared value and the freedom to choose （objects which are more or 
less the same）.  Extreme visibility is literally in-different to invisibility as the 
plethora of material objects blur into each other.  Like the hodge-podge 
Mar vel, our “Pied Man” successfully hides among the thematically 
discontinuous objects offered for consumption, for all shares the illusoriness of 
appearance in a commercial space dedicated to the superficial bandage, label, 
or badinage:
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　The pale London dawn had come, the place was full of a chilly gray light 
that filtered around the edges of the window- blinds.  I sat up and for a time I 
could not think where the ample apartment, with its counters, its piles of 
rolled stuff, its heaps of quilts and cushions, its iron pillars, might be.  Then, 
as recollection came back to me, I heard voices in conversation.
 （Wells, IM 111, italics added）
　Were he truly invisible, Griffin could of course not be tracked or chased by 
the law and its self-appointed surrogates in pursuit of various traces, edges, of 
presence.  He rather exists as “all surface,” the liminal, covering a radical 
absence of all save effect, but, that would, again metaphorically, not be different 
from one presentational reality of the British upper classes, social celebrity, or 
goods on display in a department store.  Clothing and mannequins often hide 
an absence of body beneath some calculated surface by which the body 
beneath is altogether displaced in favor of the superficialities of external style 
or fashion.  Were Griffin to appear at one of the Veneerings’ （a collective even 
in name, existing as “all surface”） parties in Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend, he 
would be quite at home, with his carapace of sartorial bandages rather than the 
accoutrements of fashion.  Or, at the other extreme, like the insignificant Jo’ 
the Crossing-Sweeper of Bleak House, continually “moved on” by authority, yet 
“wanted” for the information he possesses, apparent anonymity has a way of 
becoming meaningful, to some reader. 
　Although Grif fin’s self-possession has a number of intriguing qualities, 
invisibility defined as total visual inaccessibility or, alternatively, the omission 
of the production of a representation, is surely not one of them.  Hence the 
reader is presented with an elaborate lie functioning as a continuous trope 
from the title page onward.  Yet, it is this lie—an ontological transparency 
represented as the “invisible” by those who simultaneously see and do not see 
him—that reveals a deeper truth.  It endows the being that it defines with what 
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we might term an impersonal consciousness insofar as it can never feel itself to 
be either good or evil.  These bodies are presented as deficiencies insofar as 
they cannot feel themselves to be the way other people are, but only the way 
that things in disarray （pieces of mismatched or non-coordinated clothing, a 
vicarage left in ruin after a robbery, a ransacked “collection” of random objects 
in a used costume shop where Grif fin seeks shelter from pursuit） exist. 
Neither Griffin nor his double, Marvel, have attributes to which we might 
apply moral categories, ethical judgment, or social appraisal, but rather exist as 
a collection of hollow goods or appearances on display for perusal, gossip, or 
public consumption.  This identity would resemble the modern Omnium 
Department Store on Oxford Street, filled with its generalized curiosities, 
“patchworks,” which marks the terminus of a subject-less subject’s journey.
　There is also an inner kind of prestidigitation, in which, like the Russian 
Harlequin at a way station in route to Kurtz’ kingdom in Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness, this personality tries to talk his way into being something. The 
process of coming into this peculiar kind of being from non-being seems to 
involve haste; if I do not secure some “self,” I shall cease to exist altogether. 
Otherwise this fragile, synthetic construction of a body will fall apart.  Of 
course, this is a characteristic “figure” of nineteenth and early twentieth- 
century science fiction, familiar to readers of Frankenstein, Dracula, and the 
dialogic swallow and statue of Wilde’s “The Happy Prince.”  Perhaps the “body” 
and “consciousness” might be another significant “set,” the incarnation of the 
claims made in this essay for the “set” of transparency and invisibility. 
＊＊＊
　This body-less body is not unlike those depicted in the case histories 
detailed in Freud and Breuer’s seminal Studies in Hysteria （1892） : the patient 
continues to transmit symptoms even while being analyzed （on occasion under 
hypnosis, and hence having no control over their own bodies）, suggesting a 
16　　Jan B. Gordon
continuing life of some historically traumatic event into the present.  Griffin is 
represented in the text as similarly lacking a fully controllable corporeal body, 
yet he paradoxically maintains a curious self-possession suf ficient to 
temporarily escape either comprehension or its corollary, capture.  How can 
one have a “self”  and not have a “self”  s imultaneously,  save as a 
symptomatology ?  Or is it rather that the traditional “self” is being redefined ?
　What is being continuously narrated at both the beginning of the discipline 
of psychoanalysis and in H. G. Wells’ science fiction novel is rather a perceptual 
inaccessibility, masquerading as invisibility: of something hidden from view in 
which the patient/victim is a co-conspirator, if not an author.  And again, like 
Freud and Breuer’s patients, the so-called Invisible Man initially appears at the 
Coach and Horses Inn at Iping as the victim of some “accident or o’pration” 
（Wells, IM 8）, swathed as he is in white bandages that wrap or repress an 
inaccessible wound.  His initial perceptual reality is that of a medical case.  The 
ensuing narrative is, as would be commensurate with Grif fin’s apparent 
condition, that of the victim of some antecedent trauma, even as he victimizes 
an enlarged community of analysts by continually taking something from them. 
The patchwork of particulate plenitude （theatre costumes, goods on display, 
pebbles） and corporeal absence constitute yet another “set” in The Invisible 
Man.
　This trope that tropes itself has abundant antecedents in the culture of fin de 
siècle Europe that shaped the variously curious bodies of what came to be 
known as the avant garde.  It would seem that, to borrow from Wells’ novel, 
there is a general invitation “to come and feel about for his body” （Wells, IM 
78） during the so-called Decadence Movement.  But what kind of body is it ?  It 
cannot be felt and yet it is there, as a manifestation or consequence, a 
characteristic of another form of Being, perhaps.
　Even as a student, Sigmund Freud observed an illness which could disguise 
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its symptomatic presence from both physician and patient.  The coma which 
often accompanied “hysterical anaesthesia” was to Freud’s eye, not evidence of 
some morbidity or paralysis, but rather of the double-nature of the complaint 
which can mime other “states” of consciousness.6  It may resemble natural 
sleep or may be accompanied by such a reduction in respiration and circulation 
as to be taken for death.  During these psycho-somatic “attacks,” the division 
which normally separates the benign or remissive state of the “illness,” from its 
acute or active manifestation is obscured, just as it is for Griffin.  Because 
different phases of the “attack” can be substituted for each other, one symptom 
can be displaced by another.  This allows dif ferent “symptoms” to be 
substituted, one for the other, so that a symptom behaves like metaphor does 
in semiotics.  A physical symptom can be represented verbally and accessed by 
conversational analysis in such a way that the body belongs to two orders of 
existence simultaneously.  It is manifested as an “attack,” but continues （has 
duration） and may be symbolically displaced by （or onto） other symptoms 
which represent the attack:
During the entire attack consciousness may either be retained or lost—more 
often, the latter.  Attacks so often described are often linked together in a 
series, so that the whole attack may last for several hours or days….  Each 
phase of the attack or each separate portion of a phase may be isolated and 
may stand for the attack in rudimentary cases.
 （Freud I: 43, italics added）
　For the early Freud, hysteria comes to behave “as though anatomy did not 
exist” or “as though it had no knowledge of it” （Freud I, 169）, just as does 
anatomy for the Invisible Man.  Of course, we are very close to the instantiation 
of what will become the Unconscious, later in Freud’s career.  He posits what is 
in ef fect a “second state of consciousness” （Freud I, 153） wherein, once 
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deposited, the experience can no longer be abreacted, but is, in essence, stored. 
The “secret agent” （some initiatory trauma） is therefore simultaneously 
present and absent, a kind of undercover presence, waiting to erupt into 
consciousness.  Like the notorious demonstrator/anarchist “Professor” of 
Conrad’s The Secret Agent with his hand on the detonator of a bomb as he 
walks down the street （a novel which Conrad had originally intended to be 
dedicated to H.G. Wells）, the fugitive spirit is simultaneously an anonymous 
ordinar y citizen and yet known to the authorities who need him as an 
informational source.  As with Ego and Super-Ego in Freud’s later regenerative 
“map-making,” there is a kind of “open-ness” to each other. Griffin and Conrad’s 
explosive personalities, as well as Freud’s catatonic patients, appear as 
automatons with their respectively flexible versions of the plastique body. 
　This “second order of consciousness” （be it political or present at the dawn 
of psychoanalysis） is of course a nosological next-of-kin to a variety of fin de 
siècle models all of which share the structure of subjects imbedded within one 
another: Azam’s “somnabulic” or “hypnotic consciousness;” Binet’s “personality 
alterations;” Breuer’s “hypnoid state;” Freud’s early attempt to access the 
“truth” of dreams; Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde; Dorian Gray and 
Hallward’s “Portrait” which displaces his life onto a second consciousness, only 
intermittently accessible in Dorian’s childhood nursery.  All are surely related 
to the various “counter-will” theories prevalent in fin de siècle Europe.  What all 
of these models share is a will which is both resolute and yet powerless, not 
unlike that of Wells’ invisible man, Griffin.  A preliminary reduction or negation 
enables the emergence of a kind of counter-will which in almost every instance 
is produced by a re-marking of the body after it has been reduced to a 
“transparency,” a provisional negation that may foreshadow other fin de siècle 
negations.  The body is written down （denominated） only to then be “written 
up” （re-nominated） in a double maneuver.  In concer t these corporeal 
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negations enable philosophers, scientists, authors as well as quasi-mystics to 
produce what Freud called a “prosthetic God” （Superman） of the late 
nineteenth century.  The remission of the body subsidizes a universal.
　It is with the example of the notorious “Fraulein Elisabeth Von R.”  in which 
Freud attempted to relate pains of the body （in her case that of the leg and 
thigh） to emotional pain, that Freud fully denatures the human body.  That part 
of the body was the precise location where her bedridden father—the father 
for whose care she forsakes a prospective lover—had rested his head.  Freud 
then proceeded to map what was to become the “hysterogenic body”: the left 
leg is af flicted when the conversation turns on her dead sister and the 
surviving brother-in-law.  The right leg is afflicted with a twitching when the 
talk turns to her now deceased father.  Freud’s “treatment” （if indeed it is that） 
consisted of the careful elimination of possible organic “lesions” or causes by 
both checking for possible organic origins （gout, hypertension） but also 
purging the conventional body by traditional nineteenth –century remedies. 
The body, its tics, hesitations, slips, verbal displacements, metaphoric 
substitutions, and symbolic mis-representations of its history—a kind verbal 
harlequin—becomes a “talking body” in Freud and Breuer’s early work.  It 
becomes thereby accessible to the “talking cure” but requiring a physician as a 
necessar y qualification, one of the “scientific” burdens attached to the 
discipline of psychoanalysis.  The protagonist of Wells’ The Invisible Man 
similarly has a body whose epidermis has been eliminated （much as would be 
achieved by an X-ray image）, but a discursive, mouth-based “self” that throws 
of f speech and random symptoms.  He is simultaneously aggressive and 
passive, in response to community conventions, like attending church or 
paying bills.
＊＊＊
　Griffin’s experiment, it must not be forgotten, was initially motivated by the 
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fear that the Professor under whom he worked might claim credit for his own 
discoveries regarding the “principle of pigments and refractions” （Wells, IM 
91）.  He regards his supervising mentor, Professor Oliver, as a “scientific 
bounder” and “thief of ideas” （Wells, IM 91） with whom Griffin is unwilling to 
share credit for his new discoveries.  In a fin de siècle and Edwardian culture in 
which plagiarism and the counterfeit production of value （Pater’s distinction 
between Plato and Platonism; Freud’s problem with Breuer and Charcot; 
Wilde’s “The Importance of Being Earnest; and Gide’s Les Faux Monnaieurs） 
came to challenge the notion of à priori cultural originality partially on grounds 
of Hegelian notions of biological and historical inheritance as well as the 
surpluses or aufgehoben,8 Griffin works alone in fear of the plagiarist.  Yet he 
simultaneously needs a companion, the tramp Marvel, as a custodian of his 
secret formula for producing invisibility, fearing the authoritative “secret 
sharer” as a fake while entrusting his theories to a harlequin tramp for safe 
keeping.  The Invisible Man appropriates money which is not his on more than 
one occasion, yet enlists an unwitting “silent partner” of his resourcefulness 
even as he rails against the theft of his ideas. 
　Even though he desperately “must have a partner” （Wells, IM 84）, as Griffin 
explains to his interlocutor, Kemp, he solves the problem of intellectual 
dissemination alone by literally internalizing the formula for the reduction of 
optical density to a refractive Degree O, while seeking publicité.  If one 
definition of plagiarism might be “the deceptive dissimulation of property or 
intellectual ideas that are not those of the presumptive author,” a kind of false 
reproduction, Wells’ Invisible Man would escape that commercial threat, even 
while paradoxically finding a double/disciple in Mar vel.  The former 
demonstrator aligns assimilation, internalizing his formula （thereby making it 
resistant to the copy） and enacting it as a living, terrorizing demonstration, 
even as he looks for a pluralizing custodian.  The empty albeit lively body is, 
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after all, not so far away from death.  This is an internal inconsistency like that 
of today’s corporations who appeal for transparency, even as they vigorously 
protect patents. 
　Wells was especially sensitive to accusations of false representation, and 
blatant commercialization of scientific tenets in the work of sociologists such 
as Herbert Spencer, for he had made precisely such claims.  Accused of 
“scavenging” the work of others in his didactic, A Modern Utopia, by John 
Beattie Crozier, Wells, perhaps a precursor of the “public intellectual” of our 
own time, replied that all ideas were mixed to begin with, as if they were “in 
the air,” and hence transparently available to all.  During his own lifetime, Wells 
was forced, like many popularizers of ideas in the interests of public 
consumption, to defend himself against the charge of plagiarism, most notably 
in a case involving the Canadian historian, Florence Deeks, who claimed 
unsuccessfully that Wells had pirated her work, The Web of History, and passed 
it off as his The Outline of History.  Although she was unsuccessful in her suit, 
the legal defense of his presumptive originality cost Wells dearly, so much in 
fact, that one of his publishers requested him to take out insurance against 
further liability.9  He was both a plaintif f and defendant of accusations of 
transparent dissimulations, easily “seen through.”
　If George’s Uncle Podnerevo, the mastermind behind the transparently 
fraudulent and compositionally corrupt umbrella group of products which give 
Tono-Bungay its name, would have had such legal advice perhaps he could 
have avoided the collapse of the enterprise and his own imprisonment.  His 
own good name has been “hollowed out” by a super-inscription, a false claim, 
like that made for the product, Tono-Bungay.  For, when queried about why he 
is being arrested, the reply to his nephew suggests that he is one more fin de 
siècle counterfeiter, enabled by asserting false claims:
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　‘It’s worse than that. I done something….
They’re bound to get it out. Practically they have got it out.’
　‘What ?’
‘’Writin’ things down…I done something.’
 （Wells, TB 476）
　The proliferation of the copy, the incompletely acknowledged “double,” is of 
course enabled by a culture of transparency （perhaps initiated by the passage 
of Limited Liability provisions for corporations in 1857） which legitimated 
multiple authors or several stages （and hands） involved in the productive and 
a-crediting process, obscuring any identifiable, singular subject or author. 
Hence, the incarceration of the master of the multi-use patent medicine, Tono-
Bungay, for “taking the place of another” in a financial transaction, seems 
appropriate.  As Griffin remarks at one point in The Invisible Man, his “secret 
formula” for induced transparency cannot ever be revealed, for if such were the 
case, he would be held singularly liable for his not inconsiderable crimes.  All 
ideas remain, as Wells was to argue of the production of socialism as well as 
narrative and commercial products, “Mixed to begin with” （Wells, TB 228）.  As 
with Freud’s “traumatic event,” there is an additional, life led undercover or 
through some “double” in European culture of the period between 1880 and 
1915, which is incompletely accessible, for which an intermittent transparency 
might be an apt synecdoche.  Seeing one through the other enables both the 
activation and elevation of transparency as a metaphor and the calculated 
abandonment of subjectivity, accompanied by myriad ways of “playing” with 
the induced deceptions. A transparent medium deploys strategic blinds 
（repressions that filter）, alternately interrupting and abetting durational 
illumination.  Family histor y speaks through the unconscious body, but 
illuminated as an effect, often after some durational “clearing,” or analysis. 
　An example might be suggested in Monet’s （1903） account of the process 
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by which his observations of nature were brought back to his studio and 
allowed to become more transparent, in preparation for his work on the 
ensemble at L’Orangerie that came to constitute Les Nymphéas, as narrated by 
the art historian, Pierre Georgel:
　Le travail à l’atelier favorise la décantation des impressions immédiates et 
leur fusion dans une vision globale, moins tributaire des particularités du 
temps et de lieu que celle des tableaux de chevalet ….10
The operative concept is revealed in the French, décantation, the settling or 
emptying out of the particulate matter of existence （referred to as the “corps” 
by Monet） or experience so as to achieve a more universal –which becomes 
thereby a synonym of transparent—effect, as in decanting wine. This process 
combined a reconfiguration of the physical object （to which one critic has 
attached the complex notion of ressentiment, to feel something as an after-
effect） combined with an erasure of the particular.  This reduces opacity in order 
to create a clearing in which something previously hidden, takes shape, as a 
manifestation of viewing the object or experience, differentially.  In my own 
private experience of Les Nymphéas in fact—or at least in one of the panels—
the viewer senses himself not looking at, but looking up, from the transposed 
position of a fish in the aquarium that was the home of the water lilies, as if the 
（decanted） fish’s eyes had displaced his own in an act of transference, between 
viewing subjects.
　These reflections on the sleight of hand which binds the transparent lie of 
invisibility to a timeless, yet hollow, universality should not blind the reader to 
Wells’ radical negation of conventional notions of time and memory, no less 
than did Monet or Bergson’s contemporaneous achievements.  The reader of 
The Invisible Man almost forgets that before Griffin’s rampage, a Mr. Henfrey, 
the village clock-mender, “took off the hands of the clock and the face” and 
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“extracted the works” （Wells, IM 13）.  An instrument of conventional time-
keeping is dismantled, made transparent, as a mere face “backed” by a new 
measure of time to be launched by Griffin: “Day One of Year One of the New 
Epoch” （Wells, IM 134）, a virtual Reign of Terror of the Invisible Man by 
which perhaps we could imaginatively date Wells’ novel. As with the notion of 
A. C. E.; the re-setting of clock time after the French Revolution to mark its end 
on 18 Brumaire, （the second month of the autumn quarter of Year VII of the 
French Revolution hence “the fog”）; or Saloth Sar’s （a.k.a. Pol Pot’s） 
reformulation of a revolutionary Khymer People’s Republic’s calendar in 
Cambodia, imagined utopias often have as unconventional a time scheme as 
the memories they try to erase.  Like plagiarism, science fiction depends for its 
success upon a willingness to collectively forget the past.  The making and 
unmaking of ordinary time may well mark a transparent intersection of science 
fiction and political revolution, which Wells’ achievement surely bestrides.
＊＊＊
　The last quarter of the nineteenth century occasioned a quantum leap in the 
development of a new communicative medium, the photograph.  Once fixed 
（“exposed”）, a photograph presented an image of nature entirely self-inscribed 
by light as opposed to the creation of man or God.  In one sense, Griffin’s 
experiments with light would re-inscribe the self as a self-inscribed incomplete 
transparency, much as would say, micron photography which similarly during 
the fin de siècle, extended human vision beyond imagined possibilities, giving 
evidence of things no one could see with the naked eye.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, photography had moved “from providing a record of our 
visual experience” to become the most scientific proof of the reality of the 
invisible by virtue of chemically-induced transparent mediums, extrusive 
celluloid and silver nitrate solutions which revealed what had previously been 
hidden no less than did Freud’s presumed revelations.11
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　But, if the new cameras and sophisticated cut glass lenses could expose what 
had previously been invisible secrets to advance our knowledge of a heretofore 
inaccessible natural world, it could also be enlisted for other, more spiritual 
purposes.  Many theosophists believed that photography could reveal an 
invisible supernatural world of spirits to the trusting eye in such a way as to 
blur the dif ference between natural and supernatural.  Lacking established 
rituals, Spiritualism came to be dependent upon a combination of 
demonstration and manifestation that might be jointly subsumed under the 
notion of the spectacle, perhaps more familiar in the French, séance.  The 
spirits evoked sometimes left behind spiritual signs: musical instruments sailed 
through the air cacophonously or sounds and movements assailed the 
audience.  These performances were often so spectacular that they were 
occasionally presented in theaters in the late nineteenth century （as Charcot 
“presented” his hysterical patients, posed in operating theatres）.  Photography 
was easily enlisted as the transparent medium of manifestation that carried 
with it a set: natural science and veracity informed by a metaphysical interest. 
Extra-terrestrial spirits seemed to appear in the finished portraits of relatives. 
A photographer, like the infamous William Mumler, in fact became 
（supposedly） a qualified “medium” who channeled supernatural influences 
into the camera.12
　Photography became easily accepted as evidence of the supernatural, so that 
some photographers claimed to be able to produce “spirit” images simply by 
resting their hands on an unexposed plate.  The resulting photographs 
revealed a reality that was presumably omnipresent, but invisible to the human 
eye unless mediated by an adept who revealed its “presence” as an aura, often 
shadowing a conventionally representational object, perhaps anticipating the 
collages of Photoshop.  It may have been bad or fraudulent science, as a 
number of commentators have suggested regarding the Invisible Man’s theory 
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of matching reductions in the coefficients of the refraction of light rays among 
two differential mediums.  But perhaps, verifiability is entirely beside the point 
to the teadet of Wells’ novel, as was often the case in fin de siècle cultural, 
religious, and scientific practice, as the work of Madame Blavatsky suggests. 
　Yet, we might rhetorically ask, how could a self-inscribed proper name that 
gives Wells’ novel its title, be a distraction as well as a refraction that 
concentrates fear and belief, including that of the reader ?  At the novel’s end, 
Kemp feels for a pulse and finds none.  All witnesses to Griffin’s end saw, “faint 
and transparent as though it was made of glass” （Wells, IM 148, italics added）, 
the “outline of a hand” which grew “cloudy and opaque, even as they stared” 
（Wells, IM 149, italics added）.  The transparent body becomes a genuine 
corporeal body in its characteristically intermittent opacity only upon death, 
the slow death of life-as- transparency.  Rather than liberating Grif fin, his 
transparency is an extension of his disability, for it confines him to solitude. 
Were he to emerge into a London fog for a walk, the moisture would create yet 
another silhouette, thereby rendering him more vulnerably alive as “a bubble…
a greasy glimmer of humanity” （Wells, IM 114）.  The body as a lighter- than- 
air bubble （or airship）, and Tono-Bungay, a commercial bubble, are similar 
representations of insubstantiality.
　No wonder this “coming to life” is described as if it were incipient death: “the 
slow spreading of a poison…first a faint fogginess, and then growing rapidly 
dense and opaque” （Wells, IM 149, italics added）.  Griffin’s death resembles 
the slowly emergent developing of another familiar transparency, the X-ray 
image, “beginning at the hands and feet and creeping along his limbs to the 
vital centres of his body” （Wells, IM, 149）.  At the moment of his death as the 
Invisible Man, Griffin “comes alive as a dim outline” （Wells, IM 149）.  Just as 
an X-ray image reveals the living body as if it were a skeleton in death, so 
Grif fin comes to conventional life only when he has been apprehended 
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（apprehension, notation, being a form of non-Being）.  In the same way, a 
highly polished window would cease to be a “transparent pane of glass” at the 
moment we could see it come to life as glass （maybe by crazing）,  rather than 
as a mediating transparency.  Its death （as a transparency） would be a kind of 
life （as a provisionally embodied opacity）.
　In the “Epigraph, the miraculous Marvel has become the proprietor of a little 
inn near Port Stowe, presumably purchased by his unauthorized inheritance of 
the stolen money left in his trust by an endangered, fugitive Invisible Man. 
There, he narrates the Legend of the Invisible Man to any guests who might 
listen, with mementos on display.  Although in possession of the secret 
formulas for producing “invisibility” in the notebooks left in his custodial care 
by the deceased Griffin, the scientific executor remains unable to decipher 
them,  even disavowing “the idea of my having ‘em” （Wells, IM 149）, another 
more obviously transparent lie of The Invisible Man.
　Marvel, as alter ego of the Invisible Man, like his benefactor, never goes to 
church on Sunday morning （attended by the entire community）, but rather 
studies Griffin’s opaque notebooks—the holy text—in order to enhance the 
legend to customers of the public house.  Through a witless disciple, Marvel, 
the “Epilogue” to The Invisible Man converts the diaphanously elusive subject 
of Wells’ novel into a religious text, contributing to a local form of Spiritualism 
grounded in scientific research, but now reduced to a commercial 
adver tisement.  Guests to the public house are enter tained by sharing 
exaggerated narratives of increasingly dubious authenticity, all in support of a 
thriving commercial enterprise.  It has given the former tramp a genuinely 
solid financial “stake” in the future narratives of a country hostile to the 
subaltern.
　If Invisible Man of The Invisible Man comes alive only in death （in which he 
ceases to be an ef fect or manifestation, but becomes a proper name, not 
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needing any “the”）, then in Marvel’s narrative, he assumes a narrative aura 
sufficient to attract consumers of narratives and alcohol.  But this commercial 
aura is rather the opposite of the deployment of the term in Walter Benjamin’s 
（1936） “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”13  The lost 
aura for Benjamin was a consequence of the absence of need for personal 
attendance.  One no longer had to be physically present in Chartres Cathedral, 
along with its presumably authentic, dedicated masses absorbing its 
atmospherics, but could experience it from a detached, empty perspective, in a 
reproduction.  By contrast, Wells’ aura is not lost, but has potential duration 
insofar as it can be easily manipulated as a social effect precisely because of its 
empty transparency.  Desire and fear are re-enforced by the continuous need to 
supply a body of meaning suf ficient to maintain community belief, myth-
making, or commercial purchase.
　Wells’ The Invisible Man, from one perspective, offers a modern fugitive who 
is all aura with no corporeal substance, yet nonetheless, commands mass 
hysteria.  Any reader can see, in his confusion of life and death, variably, the 
advent of a new faith （in dubious and unverifiable science）; an age of terror; or 
a new commercialism.  Benjamin’s aura has been transformed into the 
transparency that subsidizes an infinite variety of “readings” through it. 
Marvel’s inn at Port Stowe is now a theme park or museum of its unwitting 
donor （like “Disneyland”）: a virtual Museum of the late Invisible Man.
　It was not until the mid-1930’s, that the so-called German refugee 
intellectuals—Horkheimer, Adorno, Arendt—called our attention to the 
relationship between fascism in Europe and the rise of an excessive consumer 
culture.14  In both practices, an assortment of de-individuated individuals 
leading sleepy, alienated lives comes alive only in their response to the mass 
death-cult of empty celebrity or sophisticated, but deceptive commercial 
“branding,” often using dubious scientific “findings.”  Wells, ever fearful of the 
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threat of fascism, expressed in numerous BBC interviews, may well have been 
prescient in thematically binding a transparently wasting physical illness 
（“consumption”）, a death-cult, and mass consumerism.
　This transparency of Wells’ The Invisible Man is of course synonymous with, 
if not delocalization, a new internationalism which these days has become a 
synonym for a demanded transparency, an “opening up,” in financial services 
and banking.  Yet, in late nineteenth-century Europe, the “Internationale” 
accompanied a more threatening ideology of the collective masses, as well as 
later, architecturally, the dream of a universal style.  Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 
Mme.  Blavatsky’s Chakra, Dracula, and other diaphanous presences, lack a 
singular nationality that might decisively mark them.  They are cultural and 
geographic travelers, “at home” virtually anywhere: Omnium（s）. 
　Pater’s controversial imaginary “Diaphaneitè” （1854）, the curious sickly 
catalyst “on the fine edge of light” located in the interface between two cultures 
without entering into either domination or determination seems, 15 
retrospectively, to have initiated a durational plague of transparencies lacking 
conventional bodies, perhaps culminating in Wells’ Tono-Bungay （1909）. 
Whatever strategic transparent lie constitutes the energizing, yet potentially 
deadly patent medicine （one active ingredient is strychnine !）, it gives a “kick” 
（Wells, TB 201）.  Fungible in application, it is advertised in an incredible range 
of products: lozenges, cold remedies, ointments, hair tonics, antiseptics, by 
virtue of a secret formula, “invariably weakening…as sales got ahead” （Wells, 
TB 201）.  Podnerevo suggests that successful speculative financiers, 
recognizing the hollowness of their spiritual lives, “try to make their fluid 
opulence coagulate out” （Wells, TB 308）, like Monet’s décantation, into the 
compensator y solid bricks and mor tar—veins and pigments—of the 
monumental: excessively elaborate homes.  A last label written for Tono-
Bungay surely applies to The Invisible Man with its resonance perhaps, in 
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Thomas Mann’s later, therapeutically aery international heights upon the 
spectral, sickly residents of The Magic Mountain: “TONO-BUNGAY.  Like 
Mountain Air in the Veins” （Wells, TB 195）.
NOTES
1 　Lionel Trilling, “Introduction” to Henry James, The Princess Casamassima （New York: 
Random House, 1948）, p. 18.
2 　This figure of narrative “transparency” is a kind of “virtual being,” or in James’ words, “a 
sufficiently clear being to represent the whole.”  See Henry James, “Preface” to Roderick 
Hudson, ed.  Tony Tanner （Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980, li）.
3 　Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, translated by N. M. Paul and W.S. Palmer （New 
York: Zone Books, 2002）, p. 68－73 f f.  For Bergson, if we were able to divide the 
undivided depths of time, to distinguish within it the necessary multiplicity of differential 
moments eliminating all memory, we would pass from perception to matter.  Hence, “the 
living body…is only a channel for the transmission of movements” reciprocated as 
transmitted action, voluntary or reflexive.
4 　Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. 
Trans. F.L. Podgson （New York: Kessinger Reprint, 1911）, p. 21.  My idea here would take 
exception to the interpretation of Gilles Deleuze in his Bergsonism, translated by Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam （Brooklyn: Zone Books, 1988）, pp. 31ff.  For Deleuze, 
augmentation and diminution are the only ways in which or by which space can be 
internally differentiated from itself or from other things and then, only in degree.  After 
analytic cubism and “field theory,” such an idea seems dated.  Bergson’s bias toward 
intuitionism would probably give credence to multiple forms of differentiations in kind and 
degree for both space and time.  One of Bergson’s persistent metaphors in addressing 
duration through a number of works was that of sugar dissolving through time in a glass. 
But Griffin’s dissolution of glass fragments is not really so different, in kind or degree, but 
dedicated to spatial invisibility rather than temporal duration.
  
5 　A good discussion of the importance of the Pierrot and its evolution from the Commedia 
dell’ Arte tradition to the fin de siècle is to be found in Martin Green and John Swan, The 
Triumph of Pierrot: The Commedia dell’Arte and the Modern Imagination （State Park, Pa.: 
Penn State University Press, 1993）.
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6 　Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud in 24 Volumes. 
Edited by James Strachey et. al.  （London: Hogarth Press, 1953－1966） I: 43.  What 
intrigues here is the perpetual displacement of symptoms （so that one takes the place of 
the other） over time.  If so, what the physician is really examining is how the symptoms 
are assembled, a maneuver which lends the new diagnostically- composed body a prosthetic 
or mechanical aura which may be indistinguishable from any hypnosis used in the 
treatment.  See my “Freud’s ‘Secret Agent’ and the Fin du Corps” in Fin De Siecle/Fin Du 
Globe, edited by John Stokes （Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992）, pp. 117－138.
7 　Cited in Tom Gunning, “Invisible Worlds, Visible Media” in Brought to Light: Photography 
and the Invisible.  Edited Corey Keller （New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 2008）, 
pp. 60－61.
8 　Robert Macfarlane, Original Copy: Plagiarism and Originality in Nineteenth-Century 
Literature （Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007）, especially pp. 158－211. Although not 
specifically addressed by McFarlane, biological inheritance （the repetition of an 
antecedent through time） came to be imagined as simultaneously liberating and 
restricting.  Plagiarism would be, from one perspective, a kind of self-same inheritance of 
discourse.  This irony is nowhere better represented that in Griffin’s desire to protect his 
notes from unauthorized use by Professor Oliver, combined with a need to see them 
protected （for purposes of duplication ?） by Marvel.  Although transparency could 
reproduce itself, invisibility （depending as it does upon receiver/perception） could not. 
Wells represented this same riddle of inheritance, the biological “copy” that both 
determines and liberates, in his novel, Kipps.
9 　David G. Smith, H. G. Wells: Desperately Mortal （New Haven and London: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1986）, p. 195.
10　Cited in Pierre Georgel, Les Nymphéas （Paris: Gallimard, 2006）, p. 7.  This process of 
sedimentation would, at least superficially, seem in some sense the opposite of Proust’s 
description of the constitutive amalgamations of memory in the Recherches du Temps 
Perdu.
11　Michel Frizot, A New History of Photography （Cologne: Konemann, 1998）, p. 282.
12　Alex Owen, The Darkened Room: Women, Power, and Spiritualism in Late Nineteenth-
Century England （London: Virago, 1989）.  The popularity of late nineteenth-century 
spiritualism should not be regarded as separable from metaphysical or scientific enquiry, 
even historically.  George Smathers, a relative through marriage of Bergson’s wife, and an 
officer of the “Order of the Golden Dawn,” had an interest in “layers of consciousness” 
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which corresponded to “degrees” of access to Spirit. Bergson’s diagrammatic inverted 
（vertical） cone has an uncanny resemblance to the horizontal primary and antithetical 
bobbins upon which history is bound in Yeats’ A Vision.
13　Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, translated by 
Harry Zohn （New York: Schocken, 1996）.
14　Uncannily, Benjamin’s last, albeit unfinished, work, the massive so-called “Arcades 
Project,” dealt with the predecessor of the modern shopping mall, the covered glass 
arcades of Paris, inducing a gaze through showrooms.  His sacrificial victim of capitalism 
is none other than Baudelaire who, like Griffin, ends his life on the streets, weaving poetry 
from scraps （conversation now commercialized） for sale in the anonymous covered 
bazaars.  See Alex Ross, “The Naysayers: Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and the 
Critique of Pop Culture,” The New Yorker （Sept. 15, 2014）, pp. 88－94, for the reactions 
against consumer capitalism 1930－1950. 
15　This “colourless, unclassified purity of life it can neither use for its ser vice nor 
contemplate as an ideal”̶escaping both immanence and transcendence̶re-appears in a 
number of Pater’s fictional and historically- foregrounded figures from “Sebastian van 
Stock” to Leonardo da Vinci, to the sacrificial Florian of Marius the Epicurean. See 
“Diaphanetè” in Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, edited by Adam 
Phillips （Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986）.  This sickly “type” on the “fine edge of 
light” and absent any moral sense, has a corporeal lightness against which the presumed 
weightiness of an equally abstract “authenticity” emerged among European existentialist 
philosophers as an antidote to a proliferation of “hollow men.”
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